Supply-chain threat intelligence
Risk score
92
Indexed incident for msc-terminal (npm).
Part of a multi-package malicious campaign, msc-terminal (npm author nhpkevte1576) carries the same payload as eo-terminal and logger-draft — a fully-featured infostealer and remote access trojan (RAT) deployed via a postinstall hook. All three packages share the same C2 infrastructure and attack chain.
On installation, the postinstall hook copies a large JavaScript agent to a persistent location disguised as MicrosoftSystem64 and registers it as a system service (systemd on Linux, LaunchAgent on macOS, scheduled task or registry run key on Windows). A sandbox check (CPU count and CPU model string) aborts execution in analysis environments. The install process exits cleanly with process.exit(0), leaving no visible error output.
C2 infrastructure: Primary WebSocket/HTTP C2 at ws://195.201.194.107:8010 (Hetzner Cloud, Germany). Stolen data is also exfiltrated to HuggingFace repository yszf984308/system-release via a hardcoded API token.
Capabilities (shared with campaign):
authorized_keys.env file theft — targets cloud and CI/CD credentials at install timetdata/ directory exfiltration-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Cross-platform infostealer/RAT. postinstall installs obfuscated payload.js as 'MicrosoftSystem64' persistence (schtasks/launchctl/systemd). Keylogger w/ password-field detection, 27-wallet drainer, browser+SSH cred exfil, HuggingFace as covert C2.
Affected versions
Indicators
Timeline