Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a preinstall hook into this and 31 other packages in the @redhat-cloud-services scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation.

Credential theft: Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories.

Privilege escalation: Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify /etc/sudoers.d, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts.

Self-propagation: Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL createCommitOnBranch mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate.

Persistence and evasion: Installs a daemon at /tmp/kitty-<random>, hijacks .claude/settings.json for AI agent persistence, and hijacks .vscode/tasks.json for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via __FAKE_PLATFORM__, TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__, and __IS_DAEMON environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner).

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Source: ghsa-malware (e56fbcb335c42d89cff5f0b4e76f1cd6f88b0f2a3ee3122dd10fb10edc80585b)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.