---

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (c9081ad708b658c1bd56299e401ca6a764cc9137d99573bc922d38a7381cc30d)

On npm install, postinstall.js collects host identity and environment data (os.hostname(), username, process.cwd(), process.env values, plus shelled-out whoami/hostname/id via child_process.execSync) and ships it over the network. Outbound destinations include https://app.interactsh.com (an out-of-band interaction service commonly used for blind-exfiltration / SSRF beacons) and http://lululemon.jfrog.io (a JFrog endpoint referenced by hardcoded URL — consistent with a dependency-confusion attack targeting Lululemon's internal package namespace). Collected data is base64-encoded (Buffer.from(...).toString('base64')) before transmission via https.request. index.js additionally constructs a curl -X POST command interpolating $(whoami), $(hostname), and id and runs it via child_process.exec. The 99.9.0 version number combined with the lululemon.jfrog.io reference is the canonical dependency-confusion fingerprint: publish a public package with a name matching an internal one and a high version to win resolution. Installer harm: identity, environment variables, working-directory contents, and internal-network reachability data are leaked to attacker-controlled infrastructure on every install.

Source: ghsa-malware (63f9f508d785f5cb4d1ee04827cfeedbca68cf984838c60f68629d42d216e8dd)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.