THREATPKG
SYNC STALE

Supply-chain threat intelligence

Incident detail

criticalnpm·credential theft·osv

Malicious code in atel-mcp-openclaw (npm)

atel-mcp-openclaw

Risk score

92

AI summary

Indexed incident for atel-mcp-openclaw (npm).

Description


-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (b1e4255e19fdb4f0352f184f35599be81651badab879e4f39d0f3bb4fda4a58e)

The package contains multiple structural fingerprints of an active credential-stealer / C2 implant. bin/install.js performs lifecycle-time HTTP POSTs (lines 245, 534, 688, 924) and fetch calls (line 533), executing network activity during npm install. src/setup.js fetches https://api.ipify.org and reads process.env, capturing the installer's public IP and environment for outbound transmission. src/tg-dispatch.js hard-codes https://api.telegram.org as the command-and-control endpoint, with a Telegram bot POST channel at line 416 and process.env reads at lines 54 and 71 — the canonical Telegram-bot-as-C2 pattern. src/tool.js contains five POST sites (lines 10, 16, 310, 355, 377) and base64 decoding via Buffer.from(..., 'base64'). src/listener.js, src/heartbeat.js, and src/poll-loop.js implement long-running heartbeat / polling / listener loops with additional base64-decoded payloads — the runtime backdoor surface. Combined, the package exhibits at least three independent block fingerprints: install-time outbound network with environment scraping, hardcoded Telegram C2 endpoint, and a persistent polling/heartbeat backdoor with base64-decoded payloads.

Technical details

Affected versions

<function fixed() { [native code] }

Indicators

  • affected_version<function fixed() { [native code] }75%
  • affected_version<function fixed() { [native code] }75%

Timeline

  1. Advisory published
  2. Indexed by ThreatPkg

Related incidents